The late stages of 2025 have brought an unprecedented squeeze in heavy crude oil supply. A U.S.-enforced blockade on Venezuelan oil tankers is choking off a key source of heavy, sour crude, while hopes of replacing those barrels with Middle Eastern supply are fading. At the same time, U.S. drilling activity is becoming more selective, with rig counts falling overall even as some regions add rigs. These dynamics matter because heavy crude is essential for producing diesel and other fuels at complex refineries – and yet heavy grades make up barely 10% of U.S. oil output, meaning refiners depend heavily on imports. In this report, we break down the current developments and what they mean for energy investors and operators.
The US strategy has shifted from passive sanctions to active naval interdiction. With the seizure of The Skipper and the Centuries—and the pursuit of a third vessel—the US Navy is effectively enforcing a physical firewall. This "total enforcement" doctrine creates a zone of exclusion that skyrockets insurance premiums and freezes Venezuelan export logistics.
Perhaps more damaging than the export blockade is the severing of inbound supply lines. A tanker carrying 32,000 metric tons of Russian naphtha made a U-turn to avoid US forces. Without this essential diluent, Venezuela’s extra-heavy Orinoco crude cannot flow through pipelines, forcing immediate upstream production shut-ins.
Market hopes that Iraqi crude could seamlessly replace Venezuelan barrels are colliding with economic reality. Iraqi economists estimate that the $3.50 per barrel shipping cost to the US Gulf Coast erases the discount on Basrah Heavy crude. For traders, the arbitrage window is closed; it is more profitable to sell those barrels to Asia than to ship them to the US.
Even if the arbitrage economics worked, Iraq is politically constrained. Baghdad is under pressure to compensate for previous overproduction within the OPEC+ framework. Ramping up exports to the US to backfill Venezuela would violate these quotas, risking a diplomatic rift with Saudi Arabia and Russia.
The US upstream sector is displaying extreme capital discipline. While the national rig count plunged by 8 rigs this week due to price volatility, Oklahoma actually added a rig. This signals a "flight to quality," where operators are concentrating limited capital in high-return core basins (like the Cana Woodford) while abandoning marginal acreage elsewhere.
The Trump administration has reframed the blockade not just as a political tool, but as a debt collection mechanism. By explicitly demanding the return of "stolen" assets expropriated from companies like ExxonMobil, the US is establishing a new foreign policy precedent: using kinetic power to enforce corporate restitution claims.
The United States has escalated from sanctions to an active naval blockade of Venezuelan oil, seizing multiple tankers in the Caribbean. In early December, U.S. forces seized a supertanker called The Skipper – the first vessel targeted under President Trump’s new “total blockade” order. Just days later, on December 20, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a second tanker, identified as the Panama-flagged Centuries, which was carrying ~1.8 million barrels of Venezuelan heavy Merey crude bound for China. The Centuries had been operating as part of a “shadow fleet,” using a false name (“Crag”) to evade detection. Venezuelan officials denounced the seizures as “theft and hijacking” and “a serious act of international piracy”.
U.S. authorities are not stopping at two ships. A third tanker is under pursuit by the Coast Guard in international waters near Venezuela. Reports identify this vessel as the Bella 1, a Very Large Crude Carrier that was previously sanctioned for Iran-linked oil trades. If U.S. forces succeed in intercepting the Bella 1, it would mark the third tanker stopped in less than two weeks. The rapid sequence of interdictions shows that Washington’s “blockade” is not just rhetoric – it is being actively enforced with military assets.
This crackdown has immediate implications for oil supply. Since the first ship seizure, Venezuelan crude exports have plunged, with loaded tankers now essentially stranded in port rather than risk confiscation. Analysts estimate that nearly 1 million barrels per day of Venezuelan oil could be effectively sidelined if the embargo holds, a loss that “is likely to push oil prices higher” if it persists. China – Venezuela’s largest customer – is already seeing shipments disrupted, and tankers laden with Venezuelan oil are loitering rather than sailing.
Beyond blocking exports, the U.S. blockade is also choking off Venezuela’s ability to produce. Venezuela’s extra-heavy crude must be diluted with lighter oils or naphtha to be transported, much of which it usually imports from Russia. Now, tankers carrying Russian diluent are turning back to avoid interception – one ship with 32,000 tons of Russian naphtha bound for Venezuela made a U-turn and sailed to Europe instead. Without that diluent, Venezuela will quickly run out of storage and be forced to shut in oil wells. Industry experts warn that PDVSA (the state oil company) is days away from hitting storage limits, after which production cuts become unavoidable. In short, the U.S. blockade is squeezing Venezuela’s oil industry from both ends – stopping exports and cutting off the inputs needed to keep oil flowing.
With Venezuelan barrels suddenly off the market, attention has turned to other heavy crude producers. In theory, Middle Eastern heavy sour crudes (like Iraq’s) could substitute for Venezuela’s in refineries that need that quality. Iraq’s Basrah Heavy grade is geologically similar to Venezuelan crude and currently trades at a discount of about $4 per barrel relative to Iraq’s medium grade. This raised hopes that U.S. refiners might simply import more Iraqi oil to fill the gap. However, economic reality is spoiling that idea.
Iraqi oil experts point out that shipping Basrah Heavy to the U.S. Gulf Coast costs roughly $3.50 per barrel in freight and insurance. That expense would nearly erase the price discount. “The margin just doesn’t justify it,” says Nabil Al-Marsoumi, an economist cited in Baghdad, explaining that it’s not financially viable for Iraq to replace Venezuela in the U.S. market. Essentially, any Iraqi heavy crude would arrive with almost no cost advantage – and traders aren’t going to move oil halfway around the world for free. Asian buyers remain closer and often willing to pay a premium for those barrels, so Iraq has little incentive to reroute oil to America.
There’s also a hard limit on Iraq’s ability to boost exports in the first place. Iraq is a member of the OPEC+ alliance, which means its production volumes are capped by a quota agreement. Currently, Baghdad is actually restraining output below its allowance to compensate for previous overproduction. This means Iraq cannot simply open the taps to offset a Venezuela shortfall without breaching its OPEC commitments – something it is unlikely to do given the importance of OPEC+ cohesion. In summary, the Middle East isn’t riding to the rescue. Other heavy-crude exporters like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are also bound by quotas or long-term contracts, and diverting supply to the U.S. would carry similar shipping costs. For U.S. Gulf Coast refiners, there is no quick one-for-one replacement for Venezuela’s heavy crude. The loss of those barrels could create a tighter market for heavy sour grades, potentially driving up the price spread between heavy and light oil.
Even as global heavy crude supplies tighten, U.S. domestic drilling activity is sending mixed signals. The overall U.S. rig count – a key indicator of future oil and gas production – has been falling. According to Baker Hughes data, the total active drilling rigs nationwide dropped to 542 as of mid-December, down 6 rigs in a week. Most of the decline is in oil-directed rigs, which fell by 8 to about 406 active oil rigs – a sharp year-over-year drop (there were 483 oil rigs a year ago). This suggests that many companies are pulling back on drilling new oil wells, likely due to lower prices earlier in the year and investor pressure to maintain capital discipline.
However, not all regions are following the national decline. In an interesting counter-trend, Oklahoma added a rig last week, bringing it up to 42 active rigs. That’s roughly flat compared to a year ago (when Oklahoma had 43 rigs), but it stands out because many other oil-producing states saw declines. For instance, in the same week Texas (by far the largest drilling state) saw a modest increase of 2 rigs to 230, while New Mexico (the second-largest, home to part of the Permian Basin) lost 2 rigs, down to 102. Other states like Colorado and Utah each dropped a rig. The contrast between Oklahoma and the national picture highlights how operators are focusing on specific “core” areas. Oklahoma’s steady rig count likely reflects ongoing investment in its most productive shale plays (such as the SCOOP/STACK), where companies see competitive returns. In less productive or higher-cost areas, firms are content to let rigs go idle.
This high-grading of drilling portfolios means U.S. production can hold up or even grow slightly with fewer total rigs, as long as those rigs concentrate in top-tier basins. But it also signals caution: producers are not broadly ramping up activity despite the geopolitical turmoil. They appear to be prioritizing financial discipline over expanding output at any cost. If heavy crude supplies tighten globally, the U.S. shale patch isn’t racing to fill the gap – especially since most shale oil is light and not a direct substitute for Venezuelan-type crude.
The current situation creates several challenges and trade-offs for the oil market and stakeholders:
Despite the headwinds, there are strategic moves that investors and industry players can consider in this evolving landscape:
As the U.S. blockade on Venezuela’s oil exports creates a tangible “feedstock friction” between what complex refineries need and what the market can readily supply. The single most important takeaway is that not all barrels are interchangeable – removing one of the world’s major heavy crude sources has outsized ripple effects on diesel, shipping, and global price balances. Meanwhile, U.S. drillers remain cautious, boosting efficiency rather than volume, which means the cavalry of new supply may not be coming to the rescue if prices spike.
In the near term, investors and operators should prepare for a scenario where heavy sour crude prices stay elevated relative to benchmarks, and refining margins for certain fuels fluctuate accordingly. Policymakers will be watching the effect on inflation and may adjust strategies if oil prices become a domestic concern. Looking forward, keep an eye on OPEC+ decisions – if heavy crude shortages persist, other producers (like Saudi Arabia) might adjust quality-specific output or exports to prevent an overheating of that segment of the market. Also, any diplomatic developments with Venezuela (or Iran, given the “shadow fleet” interplay) could rapidly change the equation.
Ultimately, the late-2025 events serve as a reminder of the delicate balance in global energy logistics. The oil market is well-supplied in aggregate, but the wrong barrel in the wrong place can still cause a crunch. Investors should watch how these supply dynamics evolve into 2026 and be ready to act on opportunities – or risks – arising from the heavy crude squeeze. At Bass EXP, we’ll continue to track these shifts and help our partners navigate the challenges. We don’t just follow the news – we put it to work. Learn more about direct participation in oil and gas and how to capitalize on energy market dislocations at bassexp.com.